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EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR RACIST HATE SPEECH BY THIRD-PARTIES:
COMPARISON OF APPROACHES IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
STATES.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two young African-American women answer an advertise-
ment that seeks temporary waitresses for a dinner at a large hotel. 1
The two women are hired and told to report to the hotel's main
banquet hall the next night. They do so and, except for a bit of
confusion over drink orders, things proceed quite well for the next
few hours. As the women begin to serve the main course, how-
ever, the speaker begins to joke about black men's sexual prowess.
Soon, the women hear words such as "nigger" and "sambo." 2
They are uncomfortable, but make the best of it by concen-
trating on their work and avoiding eye contact with any of the
guests. But it is too late-the speaker has spotted them. Sud-
denly, the amplification sounds ten times louder than it did a mo-
ment earlier, time freezes, and the two women feel every eye in
the room on them as the speaker says, "[D]arkies [are] good at
giving blow jobs. "3
The women then become the target of other sexually and ra-
cially explicit remarks from audience members. One of them is
asked what a black woman's vagina tastes like.4 The other feels a
man's strong arm reach across her chest. The two women run out
of the banquet room to find their manager. The manager tries to
comfort them and tells them to go home. They decide not to leave
immediately but nevertheless leave soon afterwards-still shaking
from fear and indignation.
This incident occurred in England. In Burton v. De Vere Ho-
tels Ltd., two black women, who had worked as waitresses at a
dinner put on by a local men's club, sued the hotel for violation of
1. See Burton v. De Vere Hotels Ltd., [1997] I.C.R. 1, 3 (Eng.)
2. Id. at 3.
3. See id.
4. See id.
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employment provisions of the Race Relations Act of 1976.5 These
employment provisions are Great Britain's equivalent of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The issue in this case was whether an employer could be held
liable for racial harassment by a third-party-in this case the din-
ner speaker and the dinner guests. This was an issue of first im-
pression for Great Britain. In the United States, a similar issue
was the subject of Rosenbloom v. Senior Resource, Inc., a 1996 Ti-
tle VII case.
6
This Comment will compare the treatment of this issue in
Great Britain with that in the United States.7 It will focus on the
differences between the employment provisions of the Race Rela-
tions Act of 1976 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
the different liability standards developed by British and U.S.
courts. Because Burton and Rosenbloom are the only published
opinions that have addressed this subject, this Comment will dis-
cuss those opinions in depth. It will also discuss related issues, in-
cluding the issue of employer liability for sex-based hate speech by
third-parties. Specifically, Part II explores British law, including
the Race Relations Act of 1976 and Burton v. De Vere Hotels Ltd.
Part III discusses U.S. law, including the history of Title VII and
Rosenbloom v. Senior Resource Inc.. Finally, Part IV proposes
that a liability standard similar to that used in Title VII cases be
applied to British racial harassment cases.
II. BRITISH LAW
A. Race Relations Act 1976
1. Generally
In response to the expansion of anti-Semitic activities
throughout Europe in the early 1960s, the General Assembly of
the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Declaration) in 1963.8 To
5. See id at 4; Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74 pt. II (Eng.).
6. See Rosenbloom v. Senior Resource, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 738,743 (D. Minn. 1997).
7. For a comparison of the sexual harassment statutes in Great Britain and the
United States see Nicolle R. Lipper, Comment, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A
Comparative Study of Great Britain and the United States, 13 COMp. LAB. L. J. 293 (1992).
8. See Nathan Courtney, Note, British and United States Hate Speech Legislation: A
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implement this Declaration, Great Britain's Parliament adopted
the Race Relations Act of 1965. 9 A decade later, Parliament
adopted stronger legislation, the Race Relations Act of 1976 (1976
Act).1
0
The 1976 Act strengthened its predecessor Act by adding a
section dealing with racial harassment and discrimination in the
workplace.
11
2. Section 4 (2) of the Race Relations Act of 1976
Part II of the 1976 Act deals with employment discrimination.
Section 4(2) of Part II provides in pertinent part that "[i]t is unlaw-
ful for a person, in the case of a person employed by him at an es-
tablishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against that em-
ployee... (c) by dismissing him, or subjecting him to any other
detriment. ' 1
2
Although Section 4(2) does not explicitly prohibit racial har-
assment, British courts have long held that such acts can constitute
"detriment" under Section 4(2)(c). 13 Whether a particular act of
harassment constitutes "detriment" is a factual matter decided by
the court adjudicating the case. 14
Racial harassment qualifies as detriment under the Race Re-
lations Act only if the harasser intended the victim to hear the
harassment and a reasonable employee would have complained
about it. 15 In De Souza v. Automobile Association,16 a black
woman overheard one of her managers call her a racially deroga-
Comparison, 10 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 727,733 (1993).
9. See id.; Race Relations Act, 1965 (Eng.).
10. See Courtney, supra note 8, at 740; Race Relations Act of 1976, ch. 74 (Eng.).
11. See W.T. Murphy, The British Race Relations Act of 1976, 1 COMP. LAB. L.J. 137,
137-38 (1976):
Substantial new protections against discrimination in employment have been in-
troduced. Employees complaining of discrimination are now given direct access
to industrial tribunals, and a new Commission for Racial Equality has been es-
tablished to assist and advise complainants and employers, and to promote the
policies of the new legislation. The pattern of the new legislation follows closely
that of the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, which prohibited discrimination not
covered by the Equal Pay Act of 1970, against persons by reason of their sex or
marital status in the employment field.
Id. at 137.
12. Race Relations Act of 1976, ch. 74, pt. II, § 4(2) (Eng.).
13. See Kirby v. Manpower Services Comm'n, [1980] 3 All E.R. 334, 341 (Eng.).
14. See BL Cars Ltd. v. Brown, [1983] I.C.R. 143, 144 (Eng.).
15. See De Souza v. Automobile Ass'n, [1986] I.C.R. 514,524 (C.A.)(Eng.).
16. See id. at 517.
1998]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
tory name. The black woman brought suit claiming that the racial
insult was a "detriment" to her under the Race Relations Act.
17
The court disagreed and explained that the statute required that
the insult cause her to be "treated" less favorably on the basis of
her race. 18 In the court's opinion, she could only be "treated" less
favorably if the speaker had intended for "her to overhear the
conversation in which it was used, or knew or ought reasonably to
have anticipated that the person he was talking to would pass the
insult on or that the employee would become aware of it in some
other way."
19
B. Liability of Employer for Racial Hate Speech by Third-Parties
under the Race Relations Act 1976: Burton v. De Vere Hotels Ltd.
1. Facts
On November 1, 1994, the Pennine Hotel, owned by De Vere
Hotels Ltd., hired Freda Burton and Sonia Rhule as waitresses for
a dinner put on by a local men's club.20 Andrew Pemberton, the
hotel manager in charge of the dinner, delegated the catering to
two assistant managers, Steven Smith and Nicholas Binks.
21
Mr. Pemberton knew that Mr. Bernard Manning would be the
guest speaker. 22 He also knew, from prior experience at another
hotel, that Mr. Manning was a "'blue' comedian.., likely to make
sexually explicit jokes."
23
During Mr. Manning's performance, Ms. Burton and Ms.
Rhule entered the banquet hall to clear tables.24 They heard Mr.
Manning joke about the sexual organs and sexual abilities of black
men.25 He used derogatory words such as "wog," "nigger," and
"sambo." 26 According to the lower tribunal:
17. See id. at 518.
18. See id. at 521.
19. Id. at 524.
20. See Burton v. De Vere Hotels Ltd., [1997] I.C.R. at 2-3.
21. See id. at 3. The remainder of this Comment refers to the Pennine Hotel, De
Vere Hotels Ltd., Mr. Pemberton, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Binks collectively as the "employ-
ers." It refers to Ms. Burton and Ms. Rhule collectively as the "employees."
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. Id.
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Matters became significantly worse for these applicants (who
were young Afro-Caribbean women) when Mr. Manning spot-
ted them going about their business. He made a racially offen-
sive remark to them saying: 'Very nice, that's how I like my co-
coa.' He then compounded that by making a remark that was
both racially and sexually offensive to the effect that 'darkies
were good at giving blow jobs.' Despite these remarks, which
considerably upset and offended the employees, they carried on
working as best they could. Unhappily Mr. Manning created an
atmosphere which probably encouraged some guests further to
abuse them.
27
After Mr. Manning's act was over, one of the guests asked
Ms. Rhule "what a black woman's vagina tasted like." 28 She was
appalled by the whole incident and immediately reported it to Mr.
Smith.29 Meanwhile, another guest "tried to put his arms around
[Ms. Burton] and made racially and sexually offensive" remarks. 30
Mr. Smith witnessed this scene and terminated it.31 Although Mr.
Smith did not eject the guest, he did apologize to the women.32
The following day, Ms. Burton and Ms. Rhule filed a com-
plaint against their employers stating:
We feel that the Pennine Hotel made a gross error in allowing
the whole incident to take place. Lack of supervision of the
managing staff contributed to this greatly, had they vetted Mr.
Manning and his material they would not have placed three
Afro-Caribbean waitresses in such a prejudiced atmosphere.
Racism is an issue which we feel very strongly about; to be de-
graded (a) because we are women, (b) because we are black, is
unforgivable. 33
The next day, Mr. Pemberton met with the women and wrote
an apology for the traumatic incident. 34 He also attempted, unsuc-
cessfully, to obtain compensation from the guests who had humili-
ated them.35
27. Id.
28. Id
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 3-4.
34. See id. at 4.
35. See id.
1998]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
Ms. Burton and Ms. Rhule sued their employers under the
1976 Act, complaining of "racial discrimination-unfair treat-
ment."'36 They depicted instances of racial abuse and harassment.
Although they did not complain of sexual abuse or harassment,
under these facts they could have easily pled such a claim.
37
2. Reasoning
a. Lower tribunal's reasoning
The lower industrial tribunal (lower tribunal), which serves as
a trial court for employment matters, heard the employees' case
first.38 To determine whether the employers were liable for the
racial harassment by Mr. Manning and the dinner guests, the lower
tribunal applied Section 4(2) of the Race Relations Act of 1976.
39
Under that statute, discrimination occurs when the employer
"subjects" an employee to "detriment. ' 40
Read in the overall context of the Race Relations Act, the
lower tribunal explained that the word "detriment" in subsection
(c) of Section 4(2) can be interpreted to include racial harassment
or abuse suffered by a black employee. 41 The lower tribunal also
explained that racial discrimination under the Race Relations Act
can be both an affirmative act as well as a failure to act.
42
Although the lower tribunal found that the employees had
suffered detriment within the meaning of subsection (c), the lower
tribunal did not hold the employers liable for two reasons: The
employers had not "knowingly stood by while the employees were
abused and harassed nor had they foreseen that Mr. Manning
would behave as he did. ,43
b. Appeal tribunal's reasoning
The employees appealed the lower court's ruling to the indus-
trial appeal tribunal (appeal tribunal).44 The appeal tribunal fo-
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1.
39. See id.
40. See Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, pt. II, § 4(2) (Eng.).
41. See Burton [1997] I.C.R. at 5.
42. See id. at 4.
43. ld at 6.
44. See id. at 2.
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cused its analysis on Section 4(2)(c) of the 1976 Act.
45
The appeal tribunal criticized the lower tribunal for adding an
element to the Section 4(2)(c) test.46 This element consisted of the
question: Was the employer motivated by "racial animus" when it
subjected its employee to the racial detriment?
47
The appeal tribunal explained that this question was unneces-
sary.48 The appeal tribunal further explained that Section 4(2)(c)
did not require the employer's racial animus to have motivated the
racial harassment.49 It was enough to show that the employer had
subjected the employee to racial detriment, regardless of the moti-
vation.5
0
Moreover, the appeal tribunal explained that Mr. Pemberton
subjected the employees to racial harassment by failing to foresee
the racial harassment. 51 Thus, Mr. Pemberton could be liable for
the harm even though his action, or more appropriately his inac-
tion, had not been motivated by racial animus.52 It was no defense
that Mr. Pemberton would have treated white women in the same
way-by forgetting to protect them. The only relevant issue was
whether Mr. Pemberton subjected Ms. Burton and Ms. Rhule to
racial detriment.53
To determine liability for racial harassment, the appeal tribu-
nal focused on the meaning of the word "subjecting" in Section 4
(2)(c). 54 The liability determination proved difficult, however, be-
cause the harassment had been committed by Mr. Manning and
the dinner guests-third-parties who were not agents of the em-
ployer.55
With respect to racial harassment of employees by a third-
party, the employees argued that employers have a duty to take
reasonable steps to protect employees from harassment which the
employer either knew about or should have foreseen. 56 Applying
45. See id. at 7.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 8.
53. See id. at 9.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. The Race Relations Act places the duty on employers to not "subject" the
1998]
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this test, the employees set forth five propositions which they ar-
gued lead to the inevitable conclusion that their employers sub-
jected them to racial harassment:
[1] That the employers employed the employees.
[2] That on 1 November 1994, the employers required the em-
ployees to work in what turned out in fact to be a racially and
sexually offensive environment. As a result they suffered the
detriment of racial harassment.
[3] The risk of the employees being subjected to sexual har-
assment was reasonably foreseeable. Mr. Pemberton actually
knew that Mr. Manning's act would be 'blue.' A reasonable
employer would have foreseen that the female waitresses would
or might be seriously distressed by the sexually explicit jokes he
was likely to tell.
[4] The employees failed to take any steps to guard against the
risks of sexual harassment which they should have foreseen.
The tribunal was critical of Mr. Pemberton's failure to advise
his assistant managers to keep an eye open for trouble during
Mr. Manning's act and to take steps to prevent the female staff
from being offended. They found that Mr. Pemberton simply
failed to apply his mind to what might happen to the appellants
that night.
[5] It follows that, because the employers culpably failed to
protect the employees from sexual harassment and the very
steps which would have protected them from sexual harassment
would also have protected them from racial harassment, the
employers must also have culpably failed to protect the em-
ployees from racial harassment. Therefore, they 'subjected' the
employees to the detriment they suffered, namely racial har-
assment.57
To satisfy proposition [3], the foresight component of the test,
the employees introduced a novel argument. Under the facts of
the case, the employer could foresee sexual harassment but not ra-
cial harassment.58 To bridge that gap, the employees argued that
"because they were black as well as female, it... [was] foreseeable
employee to detriment, the detriment in this case being racial harassment. See Race Rela-
tions Act, 1976, ch. 74 (Eng.).
57. Burton [1997] I.C.R. at 7-8.
58. See id. at 8.
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that they would be racially as well as sexually harassed. ' 59 To
support their novel proposition, they analogized their case to the
tort of negligence-if there is foreseeable risk of harm of a type
suffered by plaintiffs then the defendant is liable for all of the ac-
tual harm suffered by plaintiffs.
60
The employers disagreed with the employees' suggestion that
foresight of sexual harassment carries with it "foresight of racial
harassment. ' 61 They argued that this reasoning mistakenly con-
fused tort principles, where there is a single duty of care, with the
"two distinct torts of sex discrimination and race discrimination."
62
Because the employees failed to allege sexual harassment in their
suit, the employees had to persuade the court that foresight of
sexual harassment ought to be interchangeable with foresight of
racial harassment.63
To satisfy the foreseeability component, the employers be-
lieved that employees should be required to show one of the fol-
lowing:
(1) the employer had actual knowledge that racial harassment
was occurring; (2) the employer was guilty of a deliberate or
reckless failure to inform himself of what was happening; (3)
the employer had such a high degree of foresight that he knew
what was likely to happen; or'(4) the employer willfully shut his
eyes to what he ought to have known was going to happen.
64
Regarding duty, the employers argued that a breach of duty
"must go beyond a mere negligent act or omission to act."'65 In-
59. Id. The employees argued that "any dividing line between racial and sexual har-
assment would be quite artificial." Id. For guidance, the employees looked to the "Euro-
pean Commission Recommendation Number 92/131/EEC entitled 'On the Protection of
the Dignity of Women and Men at Work,' (1992 O.J. (L 49) 1) where it is said that women
of non-white origin are more likely to be the subject of sexual harassment than white
women." Id.
60. See id. at 8; see also Page v. Smith [1995] 2 All ER 736, 737. Perhaps appellants
should have made the following argument regarding the foreseeability issue: Comedians
who have a propensity for making jokes of a sexually explicit nature very often also have a
propensity for making jokes which ridicule racial or ethnic groups. Therefore, a reason-
able employer who knew they were hiring a comedian who made sexually derogatory
jokes would also have been aware that the comedian might pose a danger of making ra-
cially insensitive jokes. Under this reasoning, the danger that was foreseeable (all sorts of
derogatory jokes) would have been the same danger that actually occurred.
61. Burton [1997] I.C.R. at 9.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. Id. The Burton court used the term "culpability" to refer to "duty." Id.
1998]
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stead, there must be "either a deliberate or reckless action or a de-
liberate or reckless omission to do what was reasonable in light of
what he knew or foresaw." 66 The employers further suggested
that the word "subjecting" implies "a sense of action or decision
rather than mere negligence." 67 The employers also noted that the
Race Relations Act places a less burdensome duty on the em-
ployer than does the common-law duty of care of an employer.
68
The appeal tribunal did not wholly accept the contentions of
either side. 69 The appeal tribunal acknowledged that if the em-
ployers met a recklessness standard, racial harassment would be
present:
We do accept that, in practice, where an employer is shown to
have actual knowledge that racial harassment of an employee is
taking place, or deliberately or recklessly closes his eyes to the
fact that it is taking place, if he does not act reasonably to pre-
vent it, he will readily be found to have subjected his employee
to the detriment of racial harassment.
70
Surprisingly, the appeal tribunal rejected the liability standard
advocated by the employees, which incorporated negligence prin-
ciples. Instead, the court devised a new test-the control test.7
1
The appeal tribunal explained that the word "subjecting" in Sec-
tion 4(2)(c) does not connote actual decision but rather control:
72
A person 'subjects' another to something that he causes or al-
lows that thing to happen in circumstances where he can control
whether it happens or not. An employer subjects an employee
to the detriment of racial harassment if he causes or permits the
racial harassment to occur in circumstances in which he can
control whether it happens or not.73
The control test lies somewhere between traditional negli-
gence and strict liability, but closer to the latter. The appeal tribu-
nal was uncomfortable with a particularized foresight require-
ment.74 It emphasized the undesirability of importing negligence
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 10.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
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principles into the statutory torts of racial and sexual discrimina-
tion.75  The appeal tribunal did recognize, however, that there
would be instances when what the employer knew or foresaw
might be relevant to the degree of control the employer could ex-
ercise. 76 For instance, an unexpected or unforeseeable event
might be determined to be outside the employer's control.
The appeal tribunal also acknowledged that the degree of
control could not be ascertained by foresight alone.77 For exam-
ple, an employer might foresee the possibility of racial harassment
yet be powerless to prevent it.78 In such a case, the employer
would not be held accountable. On the other hand, harassment
might occur unexpectedly in circumstances over which the em-
ployer has control. In such a case, the employer might be deemed
to have subjected the employee to the harassment and therefore
be liable for the harm caused by it.
79
Applying these principles to the facts before it, the appeal tri-
bunal noted that Mr. Pemberton said he "would never allow young
female staff to go into a function where he knew a performer
might tell sexually explicit jokes." 80 Mr. Pemberton, however, was
careless in this respect and "did not give the matter a thought. ' 8
1
The appeal tribunal believed that he should have done so because
events within the banquet hall were clearly under the control of
Mr. Pemberton's assistants.82 The appeal tribunal believed that if
Mr. Pemberton had properly instructed the two young women,
they would not have been harassed. They might have heard a few
offensive words before being withdrawn, but nothing more.83 Be-
cause the employers clearly controlled whether or not racial har-
assment would occur under these circumstances, the appeal tribu-
nal found that the employers subjected Ms. Burton and Ms. Rhule
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. "For example, the employer of a bus or train conductor might recognize
that the employee will on certain occasions face a risk of racial harassment. Yet the pre-
vention of such [harassment] will largely be beyond the control of the employer." Id In
these circumstances, the employer can only publicly reprove the offensive behavior and
offer appropriate support to harassed employees. See id
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
1998]
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to racial harassment.84
C. Problems With the Control Test
In enunciating the control test, the appeal tribunal in Burton
interpreted the language of Section 4(2)(c) of the Race Relations
Act as imposing a duty similar to strict liability.85 The court felt
the word "subjecting" connotes control and therefore the liability
test should focus on that factor.
The language of Section 4(2)(c), however, does not mandate
the use of a strict liability test. It would have been just as reason-
able for the court to interpret the phrase "subjecting to a detri-
ment" as a negligence standard. The employer's duty would then
be a duty not to negligently subject its employees to racial harass-
ment.
The major problem 86 with the control test is expansiveness.
Conceptually, the court could use the control test to find an em-
ployer liable in virtually any situation because it can always be pre-
sumed that the employer has some control over the workplace.
For example, the owner of a temporary agency might be held li-
able under this reasoning if one of its workers is subjected to har-
assment at a work site. The argument would be that the owner
should have foreseen that some of its temporary workers might
84. See id. at 11.
85. British commentators Karon Monaghan and Makbool Javaid applauded the deci-
sion in Burton:
This result is fair and understandable. It does not make an employer liable for
racial harassment in circumstances which he has no control over but puts a duty
on him to stop it where he can. This is highly relevant for workplace harass-
ment, whether on the shop floor, in the restaurant/hotel, or public service office.
Employers should now put up notices in areas accessible to the public that racial
abuse or harassment will not be accepted whether from employees or customers.
They should also take steps to deal with it if it does occur. An employer must
properly supervise and monitor the workplace and staff.
Karon Monaghan & Makbook Javaid, No Laughing Matter, 147 NEW L.J. 350, 352 (1997).
86. It is also possible that the Burton court devised the control test to fit the facts be-
fore it. Among those facts was the absence of foreseeability that Mr. Manning would tell
race-based jokes. The hotel manager, Mr. Pemberton, had knowledge only of Mr. Man-
ning's propensity to tell sex-based jokes. If the court were to use a traditional negligence
analysis, the court would have difficulty satisfying the foreseeability component of the
negligence analysis. The court may have been reluctant to accept the appellants' argu-
ment that the foreseeability of sex-based harassment could somehow be used to show the
foreseeability of race-based harassment. In light of this reluctance, the court may have
instead decided to devise the control test to make it easier to find employers liable for ra-
cial harassment caused by third-parties. See generally Burton [1997] I.C.R. 1 (Eng.).
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face racial or sexual harassment at the places where they are
temping if they had carefully screened potential clients.
The owner could be held liable under the control test because
the owner theoretically controls the workplace through its ability to
screen potential clients. The court's imposition of such a screening
requirement would have drawbacks: (i) Screening would entail ex-
tra work for the temporary agency, (ii) could frustrate potential
clients, and, (iii) in the end, might not even accomplish its intended
purpose of preventing harassment of temporary workers.
To limit the expansiveness of the control test, a foreseeability
element should be incorporated into the test to move it closer to a
traditional negligence standard.87 Foreseeability in this instance
would entail asking the following question: Did the employer
know or have reason to know that racial harassment would likely
occur in the workplace? Although the Burton court suggested that
foreseeability could be used to temper the control test in certain
situations, it also admitted that in other situations foreseeability
would not be considered. To ensure the use of a negligence-based
liability standard, future courts should insist that a foreseeability
component always be applied in the control test.
The potential cost of enforcement represents another nega-
tive aspect of the control test. Although a workplace free from all
forms of racial and sexual harassment is a laudable goal, one must
consider the costs of enforcement. Enormous complications and
expenses will result if every employer must satisfy the high stan-
dard of behavior set by the appeal tribunal in Burton. Under such
a standard of behavior, every employer will have to determine the
boundaries of its control at any given time to prevent racial har-
assment. In addition, each employer will have to determine
whether it has taken sufficient steps correlative to its control under
the circumstances to prevent such racial harassment. Under the
control test, an employer could potentially be held liable even in
situations where it has little or no notice of the potential harm.
87. Use of the control test eliminates the comfort an employer would have knowing
that it will always be tested by a "reasonable person" standard. The control test raises the
bar-acting as a reasonable person is no longer enough in every situation. Admittedly,
there could be a situation where certain harm to an employee is foreseeable but the em-
ployer possesses insufficient control to prevent or remedy the harm. In that situation, the
employer should be excused from liability because it lacks the requisite control. By doing
this, the liability standard would shift to one based on foreseeability, tempered in certain
situations where the employer has control.
19981 885
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D. How Can Employers Minimize Potential Liability For Racial
Harassment by Third-Parties?
1. Refuse to hire racial minorities for these types of positions
In discussing ways to minimize racial harassment by third-
parties, the Burton court mentioned the possibility of refusing to
hire racial minorities for jobs where there is potential exposure to
racial slurs.88 Although that court decided this course of action
would be unacceptable, there has been litigation in the United
States in which employers have argued that women who wish to
work in establishments featuring scantily-clad waitresses must be
willing to "assume the risk" of sexual harassment.89
While society may still be willing to tolerate such establish-
ments, it is uncertain whether courts should accept, or allow, simi-
lar situations that involve racial stereotypes. For example, suppose
someone decided to open a bar catering to members of the Aryan
Nation, a white supremacist group, and hired African-American
waiters so that patrons could ridicule them. Under an assumption
of the risk analysis,90 the business owner would be protected from
liability for racial harassment by patrons so long as the owner
warned employees that they were likely to be subjected to racial
slurs and those employees agreed to assume this risk.
There is no easy answer to this dilemma. On one hand, it can
be argued that people should be free to do what they want as long
as they hurt only themselves, 91 such as the employees of the hypo-
thetical bar described above. Also, organizations such as the
NAACP would be free to exercise their own rights of free speech
in an effort to shut down the bar.
88. See BURTON, [1997] I.C.R. at 10.
89. Two men have filed suit against the Hooters restaurant chain, alleging that the
restaurant violated Title VII by hiring only women to work as waitresses. The "uniform"
for waitresses at Hooters consists of a form-fitting tank top, orange shorts, and sneakers.
See Latuga v. Hooters, Inc., No. 93-C7709 and 93-C6338, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4169, at
*21 (N.D. Il. Mar. 29, 1996).
90. On the other hand, Title VII might make it illegal for this hypothetical employer
to refuse to consider hiring African-Americans, even if the stated purpose for this refusal
is to protect candidates from racial harassment they might encounter on the job. In this
situation the employer would be in a catch-22, facing liability if it fails to hire minority
candidates and facing yet other liability if it does hire such candidates.
91. See generally James R. Stout & Thomas S. Tanana, Could California Reduce
AIDS by Modeling Nevada Prostitution Law?, 2 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 491 (1994).
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On the other hand, society has struggled hard to overcome
the detrimental effects of slavery and other institutions which op-
press people based on nothing more than the color of their skin.
Perhaps, the greater good would be served by not allowing em-
ployees to put themselves in such a situation.92 Although as indi-
viduals they might benefit financially, this benefit would be out-
weighed by the detrimental effects of such employment.
2. Refuse to allow private parties known to practice racial
discrimination on hotel grounds
After a hotel becomes aware that a dinner group will have a
host who expresses racially derogatory sentiments, the hotel has
various choices. The hotel can take action to prevent waitresses
and other employees from being harmed by those insults. Alterna-
tively, the hotel can refuse to accommodate such dinner groups.
As discussed above, an employer cannot refuse to hire racial mi-
norities on the grounds that such refusal will protect them from
hearing racial insults. Once the employer hires racial minorities,
however, it may be impossible for an employer to protect them
from all racial hate speech. 93 The best that the employer can do is
to act quickly to protect the employees once the hate speech starts.
Even removing employees from the place where they are be-
ing subjected to racial hate speech is problematic. Why should the
employee be removed? Perhaps the better approach would be for
the employer to step in and tell the dinner guests and speakers to
stop the offensive behavior. The employer could take a further
step and refuse to admit such groups onto the premises.
92. See Monaghan & Javaid, supra note 85.
What if the employer had issued a warning so as to leave the choice of working
to the women, and then seek to argue that 'all reasonable steps had been taken?'
It is unlikely that such an approach would succeed. The mere issuing of a warn-
ing for discrimination in the interests of the worker would run afoul of the provi-
sions of the Race Relations Act of 1976. The answer is to stamp out racism or
sexism in the workplace even if the source is a much valued client or customer,
and particularly when it is an inexplicably popular entertainer.
Id.
93. Two ways that the employer might prevent racial hate speech at dinner functions
would be to (1) request copies of all speeches in advance so as to review their content, or
(2) impose a rule that no dinner guests hire speakers who express racially derogatory sen-
timents, either expressly or impliedly.
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Of course, this approach will entail a financial sacrifice on the
part of the employer-but this may be a small price to pay in order
to maintain a proper working environment, free from racial big-
otry.
III. UNITED STATES LAW
A. Title VII Hostile Work Environment Doctrine
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is intended to protect
employees of private businesses from discriminatory practices.
94
Title VII makes it unlawful for employers "to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 95
A substantial part of Title VII employment litigation involves
discrimination based on sex. Courts have interpreted sex discrimi-
nation to include sexual harassment. The courts have identified
two types of sexual harassment: (1) quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment and (2) hostile work environment sexual harassment. 96 Quid
pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an employer retaliates for
an employee's failure to submit to demands for sexual favors.
Hostile work environment sexual harassment occurs when the em-
ployer creates or tolerates a working environment so replete with
sexual intimidation that an abusive working environment results.
The first type of harassment, quid pro quo harassment, occurs only
in instances of sexual discrimination. A hostile work environment,
however, can apply to both sexual and racial discrimination. 97
Courts look at the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a work environment is hostile. Factors considered include
(1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) the severity of
the discriminatory conduct; (3) whether the discriminatory con-
94. Title VII applies only to private businesses which employ fifteen or more employ-
ees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc., 216 Cal. App. 3d 1085,
1096 (1989).
95. Cynthia L. Estland, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEx. L. REV. 687, 695 (1997); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
96. See David S. Warner, Note, Third-Party Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An
Examination of Client Control, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 361 (1995).
97. See Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1102-03 (2nd Cir. 1986) (discussing
race discrimination).
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duct is physically threatening or humiliating or merely an offensive
utterance; and (4) whether the discriminatory conduct unreasona-
bly interferes with an employee's work performance.
98
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, the Supreme Court devised a
two-step inquiry to analyze hostile work environment claims: (1)
Was the employee offended by the work environment?; (2) Would
a reasonable person be offended by the work environment? 99
The court in Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc. further developed
the application of the hostile work environment concept. 100 In
Daniels, the plaintiff was the only African-American male em-
ployee in his division.10 1 He worked for his employer for ten
years, and the racial harassment climaxed during his last year of
employment. 10 2 During that last year, racially threatening slogans
were written on the bathroom walls, including "KKK all niggers
[sic] must die." 10 3 One threat was directed at the plaintiff by in-
cluding his first name: "hi Bob KKK.' 10 4 When Halloween of
that year arrived, a life-size dummy with a black head, white over-
alls, and fake blood was hung in the plaintiff's work path.10 5 Al-
though the plaintiff immediately reported this incident to his su-
pervisor, the dummy remained in place for several shifts. 10 6 The
plaintiff also suspected that a co-worker shot a bullet through the
window of his home. 10 7 After a year of such harassment, the plain-
tiff resigned. 1
08
The court performed a three-step analysis. First, it applied a
subjective standard and found that the plaintiff had suffered both
physical and psychological injuries from the racial harassment. 10 9
Second, the court applied an objective standard and concluded
that the racial harassment would have adversely affected a reason-
able person's work performance. 110  Third, the court asked
98. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 24 (1993).
99. See id. at 21.
100. See Daniels v. Essex Group, 937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991).
101. See id. at 1265.
102. See id. at 1266.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 1267.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 1273.
110. See id.
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whether the employer, aware of the harassment, had met its obli-
gation to remedy the situation.11 The court determined that the
employer failed to take remedial action.
In addition, an employer's liability under the hostile work en-
vironment doctrine also depends on whether the employee re-
sponsible for the harassment is the victim's co-worker or supervi-
sor. If a co-worker committed the harassment, the liability
standard resembles a negligence standard. Under this standard,
the employer has an obligation to remedy harm of which it has ac-
tual or constructive notice.
11 2
On the other hand, if the harasser supervises the victim, the
liability analysis differs. In this situation, courts will apply agency
principles to impute the harassing conduct of the supervisor to the
employer. Applying agency principles in this manner means that
an employer might be held liable for harassment of which it has no
notice.11
3
The U.S. Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
addressed the question of employer liability for harassment by su-
pervisors under Title VII. 114 In that case, the Court explained that
general agency principles should guide the courts. While the use
of agency principles could potentially impose liability upon em-
ployers in situations where upper management does not know that
racial harassment occurred, the Court was careful to explain that it
was rejecting the general imposition of strict liability upon em-
ployers in this situation.11 5
111. See Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988); Dillon v.
Chrysler Corp., 518 F. Supp. 170, 173 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Winfrey v. Metropolitan Utilities
Dist., 467 F. Supp. 56, 60 (D. Neb. 1979).
112. See Ways v. City of Lincoln, 871 F.2d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 1989) (regarding racially
derogatory cartoons circulated among police department employees); Rochon v. Attorney
Gen. of the U.S., 734 F. Supp. 543, 546-47 (D.D.C. 1990) (addressing an employer's duty
to adequately investigate racially harassing phone calls).
113. Arguably, an employer always has constructive notice of harassment by its super-
visors since the employer hires and trains those supervisors.
114. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
115. See id. at 72. Some states do have anti-discrimination laws that impose strict li-
ability. For example, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act holds employers
strictly liable for the harassing conduct of their agents and supervisors. See CAL. EMP.
LAW § 41.80(1)(a)(ii) (Matthew Bender, 1997); CAL. GOv. CODE § 12940(h)(1); Kelly-
Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co., 22 Cal. App. 4th 397,415 (1994); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula
Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 608 & n.6 (1989).
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B. Liability of Employer for Sexual Harassment by Third-Parties
Under Title VII
Although to date only one published Title VII case 116 dealing
with employer liability for racial hate speech by a third-party has
been published, a number of Title VII cases have dealt with em-
ployer liability for sexual harassment by a third-party. Examina-
tion of the cases dealing with gender-based discrimination can help
in understanding the issues in race-based discrimination cases be-
cause the parameters of Title VII liability are similar for gender-
based and race-based discrimination. 1 7
The following factors must be shown in a sexual harassment
hostile work environment case: "(1) [the plaintiff] belongs to a
protected class; (2) the conduct in question was unwelcome; (3)
the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment was suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to create an abusive working environ-
ment; and (5) there is some basis for imputing liability to the em-
ployer."11 8 Factor five of this test can be determinative in cases
involving potential liability for sexual harassment by third-parties.
The EEOC Guidelines state that liability may be imputed to the
employer for acts by third-parties when the plaintiff proves that
the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the sexual
harassment and failed to immediately and appropriately respond.
119
EEOC Guidelines regarding employer liability for racial har-
assment by third-parties have also been promulgated. 120 The lan-
116. See Rosenbloom v. Senior Resource, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 738 (D. Minn. 1997).
117. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 64-67 (discussing sex discrimination); Snell
v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1102-03 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing race discrimination).
118. Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500,512 (E.D. Va. 1992).
119. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (1994). These guidelines state, in pertinent part:
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with re-
spect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer
(or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the
conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action. In re-
viewing these cases the Commission will consider the extent of the employer's
control and any other legal responsibility which the employer may have with re-
spect to the conduct of such non-employees.
Id.
120. See id. § 1606.8(e). These guidelines provide:
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees with respect
to harassment of employees in the workplace on the basis of national origin,
where the employer, its agents or supervisory employees, knows or should have
known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective ac-
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guage of both sets of EEOC Guidelines is essentially the same.
Therefore, an interpretation of the Sexual Harassment Guide-
lines1 21 would also apply to the Racial Harassment Guidelines.
122
The sexual harassment EEOC Guidelines impose a negli-
gence standard of liability.123 Under a negligence framework, the
employer has a duty to take "immediate and appropriate correc-
tive action" 124 to sexual harassment. To determine whether the
employer satisfied this duty, the courts ask whether the employer
knew or should have known of the sexual harassment.
125
In addition, the courts in these types of cases examine the
amount of authority the alleged harasser has over the victim. In
so-called "client-control cases," the harasser is a client of the em-
ployer and exercises full or limited authority over the victim.
126
For example, a "client-control case" exists where an employee of a
temporary agency experiences harassment at the place where she
is temping. In this example, a third-party (i.e., the business using
the temp agency) perpetuates the harassment. The other category
of sexual harassment, based on the degree of control held by the
harasser, is "client-non-control cases."'127 In "client-non-control
cases," a third-party who does not have control over that employee
commits the harassment. For example, this type of case exists
where an employer requires a female employee to wear a reveal-
ing uniform which leads to sexual harassment by male custom-
ers.128
tion. In reviewing these cases, the Commission will consider the extent of the
employer's control and any other legal responsibility which the employer may
have with respect to the conduct of such non-employees.
Id.
121. See id. § 1604.11(e)(1994).
122. See id. § 1606.8.
123. See Ronald Turner, Title VII and Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment:
Mislabeling the Standard of Employer Liability, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 817, 820
(1994); Frederick J. Lewis & Thomas L. Henderson, Employer Liability for "Hostile Work
Environment" Sexual Harassment Created by Supervisors: The Search for an Appropriate
Standard, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 667, 733 (1994); Amanda D. Smith, Note, "Supervisor"
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, Liability Insurance and the Trend To-
wards Negligence, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 263,268 (1997).
124. 29 C.F.R. §1606.8(e).
125. See Smith, supra note 123, at 270-71.
126. Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 507-08 (E.D. Va.
1992).
127. See Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 (D. Nev. 1992).
128. See EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
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Moreover, in Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp.,129 a female
blackjack dealer alleged that she had been fired in retaliation for
protesting about sexual harassment by male customers. 130  The
Court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, not-
ing that a jury could find the defendant hotel liable for maintaining
a hostile environment even though the hotel had adopted a policy
prohibiting sexual harassment.131 The jury could find that the ho-
tel had not adequately enforced this policy because hotel man-
agement had repeatedly ignored the plaintiff's complaints.
132
The racial hate speech cases discussed in this Comment in-
volve situations where the third-party did not supervise or control
the employee and, for this reason, most closely resemble the sex-
ual harassment "client-non-control cases."
C. Liability of Employer for Racial Hate Speech by Third-Parties
under Title VII: Rosenbloom v. Senior Resource, Inc.
1. Facts
Although courts have analyzed employer liability under Title
VII for sexual harassment by a third-party, Rosenbloom v. Senior
Resource, Inc. was the first case to address this issue in the context
of racial harassment'133 In Rosenbloom, the employer, Senior Re-
source, Inc., was a social service agency which operated a senior
center at Park Center, Minneapolis. 134
On October 31, 1994, Senior Resource hired Mr. Marilyn
Lucky Reynolds Rosenbloom, an African-American male, to co-
ordinate programs at Park Center.135 His immediate supervisor
was Ms. Alice Moorman who was later replaced by Ms. Kathy Mo-
savat.136 Moorman and Mosavat both reported to Beth Zemek. 137
129. See Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. at 1024 (D. Nev. 1992).
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1030.
132. See id.
133. The U.S. District Court in Rosenbloom v. Senior Resource, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 738
(1997), addressed a situation where a third-party, who commonly visited a senior resource
center, subjected the plaintiff to racial slurs. In addressing precedent in this area, the court
stated, "the parties in the court have failed to find any case law where an employer has
been held liable for the racial harassment of an employee by a third-party." Id at 743.
134. See id. at 740.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
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Mr. Roger Kolb, who was not a client of Senior Resource, of-
ten loitered in Park Center.138 On December 9, 1994, Kolb, un-
provoked, approached Rosenbloom and threatened: "[Flucking
nigger, I'm going to kill you."'139 As a result of this incident, Kolb
was asked to leave. 140 Rosenbloom later wrote a memo to Ms.
Moorman explaining that he did not want Kolb to return to Park
Center. He also commented that clients of Senior Resource had
subjected him to racist remarks in the past.141
Despite Rosenbloom's letter, Kolb returned to Park Center
on December 12, 1994.142 This time, Kolb did not encounter Ro-
senbloom. Rather, one of the Senior Resource employees es-
corted Kolb off the premises.143 Rosenbloom complained in writ-
ing to Moorman that her response to the December 9 incident was
inadequate. 144 Moorman then spoke to her supervisor, Beth Ze-
mek, about Rosenbloom's situation. 145 On December 13, 1994,
Zemek told Moorman to write a memo instructing employees not
to allow Kolb into Park Center and to call the police immediately
if he returned.146 In addition, Senior Resource distributed anti-
racism posters and notices. 1
47
On December 16, 1994, Kolb returned again to Park Cen-
ter.148 This time, Kolb intentionally bumped into Rosenbloom and
called him a "lying black Christian."'149 Kolb entered Moorman's
office and remained there for twenty minutes until Moorman es-
corted him out.150 Meanwhile, Rosenbloom telephoned Zemek
and complained that Moorman failed to immediately remove Kolb
from Park Center.151
Following this incident, Zemek called the Minneapolis
Housing Authority and asked for a restraining order against
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 740-41.
144. See id at 741.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
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Kolb. 152 After the restraining order was issued, Kolb was never
seen again at Park Center. 153 On March 23, 1995, however, Ro-
senbloom received an anonymous racist phone call, which may
have been from Kolb.154 Rosenbloom told Zemek about the
phone call, and Zemek reassured him that she would report it to
the police and extend the restraining order.
155
In December 1994, Senior Resource fired Moorman from her
position as the Director of Park Center because of her failure to
immediately remove Kolb from Park Center on December 16.156
Mosavat replaced Moorman but Mosavat's relationship with Ro-
senbloom was no better than Moorman's relationship with him.
At a staff meeting in January of 1995, Rosenbloom complained
about the harassment by Kolb. Mosavat told him, "I don't give a
damn what you think. ' 157 Afterwards, Mosavat later apologized
for this comment.
158
Rosenbloom eventually wrote Zemek a memo regarding the
racism that he had experienced at Park Center.159 Some of the
Senior Resource clients had taunted Rosenbloom by calling him
such racial epithets as "nigger," "sambo" and "zebra." 160 These
same terms were written on tables in Park Center.161 Clients sub-
jected Rosenbloom to such abuse throughout his employment with
Senior Resource, and the situation worsened for Rosenbloom after
he planned an African-American cultural celebration. 162 This
problem was discussed at staff meetings and "at least some em-
ployees felt that little was done in the form of policies or clear di-
rection to prevent racism from occurring at Park Center." 163
Rosenbloom filed a charge of race discrimination with the
Minneapolis Civil Rights Department on April 7, 1995.164 He
claimed that he had been subjected to a racially hostile work envi-
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 741-42.
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ronment. 165 In addition, he alleged that Senior Resource failed to
address its clients' racist remarks. 166 Finally, Rosenbloom charged
Senior Resource with using a sexual harassment complaint to "set
him up" 167 for termination.
When Rosenbloom returned to work on June 16, 1995, he re-
quested to work more hours. 168 Senior Resource failed to accom-
modate Rosenbloom's request and on June 22, 1995, Rosenbloom
resigned. 169 In his resignation letter, Rosenbloom claimed that the
Senior Resource had constructively discharged him.
170
Rosenbloom sued Senior Resource in state court on May 21,
1996.171 The case was removed to federal court on June 7, 1996.172
Rosenbloom's amended complaint contained eight claims, includ-
ing a claim of race discrimination and harassment under Title
VII.173
2. Reasoning
In his complaint, Rosenbloom alleged Senior Resource sub-
jected him to a racially hostile work environment.174 In addition,
Rosenbloom alleged that Senior Resource discharged him because
of: (1) the incidents with Kolb in December of 1994, and (2) the
racial slurs made against him by clients of Senior Resource. 175
First, Rosenbloom argued that Senior Resource's liability for these
actions stemmed from Kolb's position as a Senior Resource volun-
teer and therefore as its agent. 176 Second, Rosenbloom contended
that "Moorman and Mosavat had a duty to respond to the racist
behavior by Kolb and other clients, and by failing to respond, rati-
fied the racism." 177 The court summarily dismissed the first theory
because of a lack of evidence that Kolb volunteered with Senior
Resource. 178
165. See id.
166. Id. at 742.
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 742-43.
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As to Rosenbloom's second theory, the court noted that it
raised an "interesting and difficult question of first impression
within the Eighth Circuit and possibly the Federal Courts." 179 The
court further noted that:
Rosenbloom suggests that an employer may be liable for acts of
third-parties that create a racial hostile work environment if the
employer fails to take steps to remedy the harassment once it
becomes known to the employer. Rosenbloom argues that by
failing to keep Kolb from returning to Park Center, and by not
instituting a policy to deal with racial slurs, Senior Resource
ratified the racist behavior.
180
The court began its analysis by explaining that it was unaware
of any case law dealing with the question of whether an employer
can be liable for a third-party's racial harassment of an em-
ployee. 181 The court did explain, however, that several courts had
ruled that an employer may be liable for sexual hostile work envi-
ronment when the employer knows of the harassing conduct and
neglects to take steps to remedy the harassment. 182 Next, the
court explained that commentators have noted that such liability in
the sexual hostile work environment represents a recent expansion
of conventional interpretations of Title VII and the Supreme
Court has "warned against unsubstantiated judicial extensions of
employer liability not contemplated within the Civil Rights Act of
1964."183 The court noted that its own Eighth Circuit had never
before extended an employer's liability in this manner.184
The court explained that "most of the cases involving em-
ployer liability for third-party sexual harassment involved one of
two situations." 185 In the first situation, the third-party exercises
control over the employee. 186 For example, such a situation occurs
179. Id at 743.
180. Id
181. See id The court stated that "[tihe parties and the Court have failed to find any
case law where an employer has been held liable for the racial harassment of an employee
by a third-party." It
182. See id.; see, e.g., Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 (D.
Nev. 1992); Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 512 (E.D. Va.
1992); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
183. Rosenbloom v. Senior Resource Ctr., 974 F. Supp. at 743; Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
184. See Rosenbloom, 974 F. Supp. at 743.
185. Id.
186. See Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 507-11 (E.D. Va.
1992).
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when an employee of a temporary agency sues the agency after
being placed into a sexual hostile work environment. 187 In this
situation, both the temporary agency and the business using the
agency's services exercise control over the employee. The agency,
as the ultimate employer, can be held liable.
188
In the second situation, an employer establishes a policy or
dress code that makes the employee's "acquiescence in sexual har-
assment by the public.. . a prerequisite of her employment. ' 189 In
addition, the court noted that "several courts have gone beyond
these two categories of cases and suggest[ed] that employers have
a broad duty to protect their employees from sexual harassment,
even when an employer does not directly benefit from the harass-
ment." 190
The court acknowledged that circumstances might exist where
an employer could be held liable for a racially hostile work envi-
ronment created by a third-party. 191 In the case before it, how-
ever, the court found that "there is no evidence Senior Resource
benefited from Kolb's disruptive behavior or from the racist slurs
by its clients."'192 Instead, the court found that the record showed
Senior Resource was indeed concerned about each incident, and
on at least on one occasion, tried to remedy the situation immedi-
ately. 193 Although the court was disappointed that Senior Re-
source failed to respond more quickly to the racist remarks by its
clients, the court explained that no facts demonstrated Senior Re-
source ratified such comments. 194 Rather, the court noted that
187. See Rosenbloom, 974 F. Supp. at 743.
188. See id.
189. EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also
Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc., 552 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Minn. 1996) (discussing a restaurant owner's
statement that he was "trying to sell legs").
190. Rosenbloom, 974 F. Supp. at 743; see generally Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Nev.
1992).
191. Rosenbloom, 974 F. Supp. at 743-44. In the court's words, "[j]ust as in sexual hos-
tile work environment cases, there may be circumstances where an employer can be held
liable for the racial hostile work environment created by a third-party." Id
192. Rosenbloom, 974 F. Supp. at 744.
193. See id.
194. See id. If the court found that Senior Resource ratified the racist comments of
Kolb and others, the court could, under a Title VII analysis, impute liability for those
statements to Senior Resource.
An employer acts within the scope of his or her employment usually by exercis-
ing the powers actually vested in him or her; however, if an employer becomes
aware of harassment by a supervisor and does nothing to stop it, the employer,
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Senior Resource had taken steps to educate its clients by distrib-
uting posters and notices discouraging racism.
195
Finally, the court explained that it "did not intend to mini-
mize Kolb's conduct or the racist remarks."'196 The court felt that
no one should have to endure the treatment Rosenbloom en-
dured. 197 The court found that "federal law, however, does not
hold an employer liable in all circumstances for a third-party's dis-
criminatory behavior." 198
D. Problems With the Title VII Hostile Work Environment
Doctrine as Used in Cases Involving Racial Harassment by Third-
Parties
One problem with the Title VII hostile work environment
doctrine is that it places too high of a burden of proof on the plain-
tiff employee. Rosenbloom required that the employer have
knowledge of the harassment before requiring the employer to
remedy the harm.199 In addition, the court was also lenient in its
review of the propriety of the remedy. In the court's view, the
memo that Senior Resource issued, which barred Kolb from Park
Center, and its attempt on one occasion to immediately stop the
harassment, represented an appropriate remedy.200
U.S. courts, applying Title VII law in the same manner as in
Rosenbloom, might not have found the defendants in Burton li-
able. In Burton, the defendants knew that Mr. Manning would
likely make sexually explicit remarks. They did not, however,
know that he might make race-based remarks. For this reason, a
U.S. court, under a Title VII analysis, might have absolved the
employers of responsibility because the racial harassment by Mr.
Manning was not foreseeable. Even if the employers had known
that Mr. Manning had a propensity to tell race-based jokes, a Title
VII liability standard, which resembles a negligence standard,
by acquiescing, has brought the supervisor's actions within the scope of em-
ployment.
2 CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAW 41-272, § 41.81(6)(a)(M. Kirby Wilcox ed., Matthew
Bender 1997).
195. See Rosenbloom, 974 F. Supp. at 744.
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 744 n.6.
200. See iUL
19981
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would require that the employer have notice of the particular
harm to the employees.
Similarly, the British court in Burton explained that the em-
ployer hotel could only, foresee sexually derogatory remarks, but
not racially derogatory remarks. That court, however, applied the
control test, thereby enabling the court to find the employer liable
for the racial harassment experienced by Ms. Burton and Ms.
Rhule. The court found the employer hotel liable even though the
court admitted that under the facts, the employer would not have
foreseen that the women would be racially harassed by Mr. Man-
ning or the guests.
In addition, a Title VII analysis would consider that the har-
assment of the women only occurred on that single occasion. In
Ellison v. Brady,201 the court explained that both the severity and
the frequency of harassment must be considered. If the employee
experiences extremely severe harassment, a single incident may
give rise to a hostile work environment.20 2 On the other hand, less
severe harassment that occurs repeatedly can also give rise to a
hostile work environment.
20 3
Thus, because the harassment in Burton only occurred on that
one night, a court applying Title VII principles would need to find
that the employees experienced extremely severe harassment in
order to determine that a hostile work environment existed. Al-
though Mr. Manning directed some of his jokes at the women
rather than to the general audience, that fact alone may not consti-
tute severe harassment sufficient to create a hostile work environ-
ment. A more significant fact other than Mr. Manning's jokes is
that some of the dinner guests physically harassed the women.204
If the court, however, determines that the employer could not
foresee this physical harassment, these actions may also be insuffi-
cient to support the finding of a hostile work environment.
201. 924 F. 2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
202. See id. at 878.
203. See id
204. See generally Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 610
(1989).
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IV. PROPOSED LIABILITY STANDARD
A. Continuum of Liability Standards
Imagine a liability continuum, on one end of which sits a strict
liability standard that holds the employer liable even where no
fault exists. At the opposite end is an intentional act standard that
requires the employer to act with recklessness or an intent to cause
the harm. On this continuum, the control test is located closer to
the strict liability standard. The Title VII hostile work environ-
ment test is located closer towards the middle, where a negligence
standard would be located.
The following subsection recommends that Britain abandon
the control test in favor of a negligence standard similar to that
used in Title VII hostile work environment cases.
20 5
B. Proposed Liability Standard for British Cases: A Modified
Negligence Standard
As described above, courts could apply a wide range of liabil-
ity standards to situations where a third-party subjects an em-
ployee to racial hate speech. Using a liability standard such as
strict liability affords the greatest protection to minority employ-
ees. Conversely, the use of a liability standard with a recklessness
or intent requirement best protects employers against unwarranted
and unfair claims.
The case law on this subject takes different courses in Britain
and the United States. In Burton, the only British case on this
subject, the court devised the control test, a test closely resembling
a strict liability standard. 206 In the United States, the court in Ro-
senbloom v. Senior Resource Center20 7 applied the Title VII hostile
work environment doctrine, which is essentially a negligence stan-
dard.208
205. This recommendation is made despite faults with the Title VII hostile work envi-
ronment standard identified in the preceding subsection of this Comment. Although the
Title VII standard may at times fail to provide a remedy for aggrieved employees, this
failure is outweighed by the great strength of the Title VII standard-its inherent flexibil-
ity and commensurate use in fairly allocating fault.
206. See Burton v. De Vere Hotels Ltd., [1997] I.C.R. 1, at 10.
207. See Rosenbloom, 974 F. Supp. 738 (1997).
208. Although the language of the Race Relations Act and Title VII differs, courts
could, if they wished, construe each of these statutes so that their liability standards be-
come essentially equivalent.
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As explained earlier, the primary problem with the control
test is that it is too rigid and could open the floodgates to a greater
number of lawsuits against employers.20 9 A negligence standard,
which is inherently more flexible than a strict liability standard, is
more appropriate 210 for determining employer liability. This is
true especially in instances where a third-party211 commits the ra-
cial harassment.
One way to formulate a negligence-based liability test under.
the Race Relations Act is to begin with a negligence test that util-
izes an objective "reasonable person" standard, and then modify
that test for use in situations of racial harassment by third-parties.
This test comprises of two basic components: (1) duty and (2)
foreseeability.
The first component of the test imposes a duty on the em-
ployer to protect its employees from racial harassment by third-
parties. 212 The language of section 4(2)(c) of the Race Relations
209. See generally Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F.3d 490 (1996).
210. In Jansen, the court explained that the standard of liability in Title VII sexual har-
assment hostile work environment cases should be a negligence standard. See id. at 494,
501-02. The court stated:
Because a hostile work environment is difficult to define, employers may be un-
able to send an unambiguous message to employees. I believe the appropriate
inquiry in dealing with this conduct remains whether the company has taken due
care to prevent harassment and to respond to complaints of harassment. Tradi-
tionally, courts have viewed negligence as a close approximation of what the
prevention of harm should cost to the company.
l at 501-02 (citations omitted). The court also extolled the flexibility inherent in a negli-
gence standard: "By its conception, negligence possesses the flexibility to respond by de-
gree to amorphous or variable harms, such as this one." Id. (citations omitted).
211. Contrast this third-party situation where the victim's supervisor commits the har-
assment. In such a situation, courts will apply agency principles to impute liability to the
employer in a manner which resembles strict liability. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57,63 (1986).
212. The Burton court's control test resembles the duty component of the negligence
standard discussed above, without a foreseeability component to limit liability. Without a
foreseeability component, the control test edges towards a strict liability standard, al-
though the test uses lack of foreseeability in certain circumstances to show that the em-
ployer had no control over the work environment. The Burton court described the classic
situation where an employer would lack control over the workplace-a bus driver who
could constantly be exposed to racial harassment by passengers and others. In such cir-
cumstances, the most obvious solution would be for the employer to warn all prospective
employees that they may be subject to this type of harassment but that the employer will
not consider this possibility when making the decision to hire them. Having given this
warning, the employer would not be under any further duty to protect the employee from
harm outside the scope of any protection which the employer could reasonably offer. See
Burton v. De Vere Hotels Ltd. [1997] I.C.R. at 10.
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Act creates a duty not to "subject" an employee to "detriment.
213
Detriment includes racial harassment.
With respect to harm caused by third-parties, the foreseeabil-
ity of the particular harm occurring limits the scope of the em-
ployer's duty. The amount of control the employer has over the
workplace also qualifies the employer's duty. The employer bears
responsibility only for those aspects of the work environment over
which it reasonably can exercise control.
The foreseeability component represents the second compo-
nent of the negligence-based liability test. It holds employers li-
able for those actions foreseeable to a reasonable employer, oper-
ating with the abilities and limitations of an average employer in
the same situation. 214 Thus, the employer has the responsibility to
prevent racial harassment that it actually foresees or that it should
have foreseen.
A requirement of actual knowledge does not trouble
courts. 215 But the concept of constructive knowledge does.
216
Thus, courts should use constructive knowledge with restraint
when acts of third persons are involved. The courts should exer-
cise such restraint because acts by third persons may be difficult or
even impossible to foresee.
To ensure that it does not become too easy for employers to
evade liability under this prong of the test, the courts should pre-
scribe factors that an employer can consider in determining
whether racial harassment by third-parties is likely to occur. These
factors could include the following: (1) Whether the employer was
previously aware of the presence of third persons and of their pro-
pensity for this type of behavior; and (2) Assuming that the first
factor is not present, whether in the given employment situation,
the employer should have been aware of the likely presence of
third persons who would commit acts of racial harassment.
In addition, the court should carefully examine the propriety
of prophylactic measures. It would be helpful if courts refused to
give free reign to employers in this area. The public policy of pro-
tecting minorities, who cannot effectively protect themselves, dic-
tates that courts will err, if at all, in affording too many rather than
213. Race Relations Act 1976, ch. 74, pt. II, § 4(2) (Eng.).
214. See Burton [1997] I.C.R. at 8.
215. See id. at 9-10.
216. See id.
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too few protective measures.
The components of a negligence standard under the Race
Relations Act can be summarized as follows: (1) Duty of an em-
ployer to avoid subjecting its employees to detriment; (2) Foresee-
ability, that is, did the employer actually foresee, or would a rea-
sonable employer have foreseen that the harm would occur; and
(3) Appropriateness of the Remedy, that is, did the employer un-
der the circumstances take appropriate measures to prevent or
stop the harm?
The propriety of the measures is a subjective factor deter-
mined by a judge or jury. Some factors that might be considered
in making this determination include: (1) How soon after the em-
ployee reported the harm did the employer respond to it? (2)
How effective was the employer's response in nullifying the harm?
(3) How would a reasonable employer in the same situation have
responded?
While the standards upon which a determination of liability
will be made are important, it is equally, if not more important,
that the decision-maker exercise wisdom in applying the standard.
This is especially true when using a negligence standard because
such a test is inherently flexible and its success depends heavily
upon the court's sound judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
Although most people do not consider themselves racist, psy-
chologists maintain that we all have subconcious biases.217 De-
spite slow progress in civil rights jurisprudence over the last two
decades, progress nevertheless continues to be made on this front.
As we all move forward, employers will continue to face situations
where legal pressure to provide a workplace free from racial har-
assment conflicts with the practical realities of running a business.
While it would be nice to shield all persons from cruelty, especially
cruelty based on race, this is virtually impossible. The only rea-
sonable option then, is for society to do its utmost to rid work-
places of race-based harassment while simultaneously acknowl-
edging that some individuals will occasionally be hurt.
217. See Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,322.
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British courts have gone too far in their efforts to protect in-
dividuals from race-based harassment. The control test, while
laudable, imposes too much potential liability on employers-it is
close to a strict liability standard. Rather, because it is often diffi-
cult for employers to predict the behavior of third-parties, British
courts should reinterpret the language of the 1976 Act as imposing
a more flexible negligence standard.
This negligence standard should be modified for use in situa-
tions where third-parties have racially harassed an employee. This
can be achieved by considering whether a reasonable employer
would have foreseen the possibility of race-based harassment by
third-parties and whether the employer took appropriate measures
to remedy the harm.
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